Bremer claims he was used as Iraq ‘fall guy’
By Edward Alden and Guy Dinmore in Washington
Published: January 9 2006 20:17 | Last updated: January 9 2006 20:17
Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, says that senior US military officials tried to make him a scapegoat for postwar setbacks,
including the decision to disband the Iraqi army following the US invasion in 2003.
In a memoir published on Monday that broke a more than year-long silence, Mr Bremer portrays himself in a constant struggle with Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, and military leaders who were determined to reduce the US troop presence as quickly as possible in 2004 despite the escalating insurgency.
He also writes how Mr Rumsfeld was “clearly unhappy” that Condoleezza Rice, then national security adviser, had taken control of Iraq policy from the Pentagon in late 2003.
A Pentagon spokesman on Monday confirmed that Mr Bremer had sent Mr Rumsfeld a memo based on a report by the
Rand Corporation consultancy 
that recommended 500,000 US troops would be needed to pacify Iraq – far more than were sent. But Mr Bremer’s advice was rejected by military leaders and Mr Rumsfeld.
Mr Bremer’s account of his 13 months as Iraq’s governor is at times vituperative – scathing of the Iraqi exiles who formed the initial Iraqi Governing Council, resentful of Democrats in Congress who sniped at his efforts, the press for focusing on the negative and feeding on leaks, and bureaucrats in Washington who obfuscated when he was trying to rebuild an entire country.
“They couldn’t organise a parade, let alone run a country,” Mr Bremer writes of the Iraqi politicians.
Even allies come in for some criticism, including Britain for being “weak-kneed” in avoiding a showdown with a militant Shia cleric.
What emerges clearly from the diary is that t
here was no detailed postwar reconstruction plan,
that the US lacked decent intelligence to deal with an insurgency it failed to predict, and the naivety of Americans who were shocked at the dismal state of Iraq’s economy and infrastructure after years of sanctions.
Mr Bremer accuses Pentagon officials of setting him up to take the fall for the postwar failures in Iraq, even though the
decision to disband the army was personally approved by Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy defence secretary, and cleared by Mr Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush.
Mr Bremer – who headed the CPA during the crucial period from May 2003 until transferring sovereignty in June 2004 – has been widely blamed for acting precipitously in disbanding the army.
Critics say that decision fuelled the insurgency by leaving the army’s Sunni leadership unemployed and hostile to the US occupation.
But he defends the decision, insisting that reconstituting a Sunni-led Iraqi army would have plunged the country into civil war.
He says that military leaders, including the commanding US general John Abizaid, exaggerated the readiness of Iraqi police and military forces in an effort to justify reducing the US troop presence. At the same time, Pentagon civilians, led Mr Wolfowitz and Doug Feith, were urging him to transfer Iraqi sovereignty quickly.
In one particularly bleak moment in October 2003, Mr Bremer pleaded with the president to back him in this internal struggle. “I’m concerned that a lot of the Pentagon’s frenetic push on the political stuff is meant to set me up as a fall guy,” he told Mr Bush at the White House. When the president looked puzzled, he added: “In effect the DoD position would be that they’d recommended a quick end to ‘occupation’, but I had resisted so any problems from here on out were my fault.”
Mr Bremer lauds the president for backing him in most of these battles. He concludes by saying the continuing war is a noble enterprise that the US must complete.